Although the main fault line between left and right falls between the responsible and the irresponsible, the secondary line is the role played by heredity; and this, in turn, relates to ideas that surround inequality. Since the left presents itself as for equality in various dimensions and to various extents, many rightists—in reaction against the left—assume that they are for inequality and hierarchy; but this is a misnomer, the right really defends responsibility—and responsible people care about their posterity, their children.
Responsible action creates hierarchies and inequalities, but these are by-products, not goals in themselves; and rightists who promote themselves as “for inequality” and “for hierarchy” fall into the left’s rhetorical trap: they are greedy, power-mad people who enjoy inequality and coercion. Really, nobody seeks inequality as a goal in itself; what would be the point? And nobody seeks a hierarchy as a good in itself either; do you impose hierarchical relations on your friends, for example? Indeed, the ideal state is a heterarchy—in accordance with the Tao—a situation where people can relate at different levels, hierarchically, and also equally as required; and this is no utopia, for it is to be found in religious communities and computer science. To defend hierarchy alone is to be as rigid and detached from reality as to defend egalitarian relations alone: a combination is possible, but it requires complete submission and self-abnegation to a higher goal—a monadic relation to reality.
As regards heredity, the French Revolution—the point where the contemporary left-right split manifested—was, in essence, a dispute about heredity. Those men who supported the revolution, such as Tom Paine, claimed that heredity was nonsense: it was as foolish to suggest the king’s son should rule as to suggest the Astronomer Royal should let his post be inherited by his son. Paine was wrong; indeed, it is very likely the Astronomer Royal’s son would make a fine astronomer—everything we now know about genetics confirms this view. Intelligence and temperament, as any farmer could tell you, are inherited; and this means that the blacksmith’s son is suited to be a blacksmith, and the king’s son is suited to rule.
Generation by generation there are small variations: brilliant men arise in extreme poverty—men like Jimmy Savile in Britain, a member of Mensa and a pervert. When exceptional intelligence arises in modest families it is probably due to mutation—and that mutation may also disturb the individual’s personality. So we find that pedigree is not merely about intelligence, it is also about character. Savile was bright, but he had no character; and in a better age would have been flushed to the lowest level where he belonged, not promoted to spread his sinister personality on the nation’s television screens.
Contemporary arguments about race reprise the French Revolution’s dispute over heredity on a mass basis. It is not the aristocracy as a group that is indicted; they have been neutered these long years: the question now is how far the principle can be extended, particularly to the whites, who, as a group, constitute an analogical global aristocracy. The hegemonic ideology in today’s West maintains—contrary to all scientific and spiritual evidence—that man is a blank slate; we begin afresh with each new man, as Paine thought.
Even “meritocrats”—sour people for the most part, often Jews out to overthrow the natural order in their adopted societies—lean somewhat against heredity; they are quick to claim people in powerful positions do not deserve to be there. The meritocrats are atomisers; if the son in a family business has an IQ of 106 and a foreigner has an IQ of 108, the meritocrat smugly gives the family business to the foreigner against all natural sentiment and against all character; and this is because the meritocrat half accepts the left’s blank slate. He merely makes an exception for intelligence, though he misses character, temperament, and the wisdom in tradition. Ultimately, it all comes back to blood.